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I. INTRODUCTION: BRETTON WOODS
INSTITUTIONS AND THE U.S. LEGACY
The World Trade Organization (“WTO”) and its predecessor, the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) of 1947, 1 were
established to promote peace by putting a break on beggar-thyneighbor protectionist policies, believed to have largely contributed
to global economic depression and the rise of Adolf Hitler and
fascism in Europe.2 At the conference that led to their creation at
* Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law. An
earlier version of this article was written for and delivered at a symposium titled
“International Trade and Sustainable Development,” held at Sungkyunkwan
University College of Law, Seoul, South Korea, on October 9, 2010. This
undertaking was made possible through a grant from the Brain Korea 21 project.
The author wishes to thank her research assistant as well as Yujin Kim and
Alexander Xenopoulos for their assistance in preparing this article for submission.
1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867
U.N.T.S. 187.
2. See James M. Boughton, The Role of the IMF in Peace and Security, 20
AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1117, 1117-22 (2005), reprinted in TRADE AS GUARANTOR
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Bretton Woods, the Allied nations recognized that great differences
in wealth between nations and peoples were not conducive to world
peace. The architects of the post–World War II economic system,
John Maynard Keynes and Harry Dexter White, hoped that the
Bretton Woods institutions would be a bulwark against protectionism
and assist countries during economic hardship, while rebuilding wartorn Europe and Japan.3
Ironically, with the decline of U.S. power, the influence of
principles long championed by the United States, such as
transparency, accountability, participation, and promotion of the rule
of law, is on the rise. These “good governance” criteria (or at least
the rhetoric surrounding them) have been adopted by nations and by
international organizations and civil society groups.4 For example,
the WTO promotes a U.S.-inspired vision of the regulatory state,
emphasizing domestic transparency and predictability in the
administration or application of trade-related measures (an everexpanding category) and privileging procedure for its legitimation of
OF PEACE, LIBERTY AND SECURITY?—CRITICAL, EMPIRICAL AND HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVES 6 (Padideh Ala’i et al. eds., 2006) (highlighting the existence of a

link between global free trade and peace and prosperity); Julio A. Lacarte, The
Role of the Bretton Woods Institutions in Securing the Peace, 20 AM. U. INT'L L.
REV. 1127, 1127-32, reprinted in TRADE AS GUARANTOR OF PEACE, LIBERTY AND
SECURITY?—CRITICAL, EMPIRICAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra, at 1
(explaining that the GATT carried out trade liberalization rounds in response to
post–World War II protectionist measures that curtailed international commerce).
3. See Boughton, supra note 2, at 1118-22 (arguing that the idea of an
interconnection between free trade and peace and prosperity influenced Keynes’s
and White’s work even before Bretton Woods in 1944). Importantly, the post–
World War II economic order was built on an economic/non-economic distinction.
Article I of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund states
that the purposes of the IMF are, among other things, to “provide[] . . . consultation
and collaboration on international monetary problems,” to “promot[e] and
maint[ain] high levels of employment and real income[,] and to . . . develop[] . . .
the productive resources of all members.” See Articles of Agreement of the
International Monetary Fund, art. I(i)-(ii), Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1401, 2 U.N.T.S.
39. Article IV, on the other hand, states that the IMF, in fulfilling its surveillance
duties, “shall [respect] . . . the domestic social [and] political policies of the
members.” Id. art. IV(5)(f).
4. See generally What is Good Governance?, U.N. ECON. & SOC. COMM’N
FOR ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, http://www.unescap.org/pdd/prs/ProjectActivities/
Ongoing/gg/governance.asp (last visited Sept. 1, 2011) (defining “good
governance” so as to include eight basic characteristics: “It is participatory,
consensus oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient,
equitable and inclusive[,] and follows the rule of law.”).
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substance or end results despite their unpopularity.5 The WTO
dispute settlement system has also gravitated towards U.S.-style
litigation, as WTO members who have traditionally shied away from
airing their grievances through litigation (for example, China)
increasingly resort to litigation to resolve their concerns. In addition,
the WTO Appellate Body conducts U.S.-style legal analysis,
applying balancing tests to evaluate, on a fact-specific basis,
competing policy objectives and public interests while emphasizing
the need for consistency and predictability.
It is against this backdrop that this work discusses the creation,
evolution, and future of the WTO and its role in promoting
“sustainable development.”6 First, it explores the evolving mandate
of the WTO. Then, it examines the evolution of GATT Article X
(“Publication and Regulation of Trade Administration”). Third, it
analyzes the evolution of GATT Article XX (“General Exceptions”).
Finally, it concludes with some thoughts about what this evolution
has meant and should mean for the future of the WTO.

5. See William Mock, On the Centrality of Information Law: A Rational
Choice Discussion of Information Law and Transparency, 17 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 1069, 1082 (1999), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract_id=1027611 (defining “transparency” as “the provision of access to
official information for social, political, and economic functioning,” or “a measure
of the degree to which information about official activity is made available to an
interested party”); cf. Press Release, WTO Trade Policy Review Body, Structural
Problems Are Inhibiting Development, PRESS/TPRB/309 (Apr. 22, 2009),
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp309_e.htm (reporting that structural
problems, such as diminished transparency and predictability, hinder the
development of business and competitiveness in Mozambique).
6. See generally U.N. Env’t Programme, World Comm’n on Env’t & Dev.
(Brundtland Comm’n), Our Common Future: Rep. of the World Commission on
Environment and Development in Accordance with Paragraph 10 of General
Assembly Resolution 38/161 (1983), transmitted by Note of the Secretary-General,
ch. 2, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/42/427, Annex (Aug. 4, 1987) [hereinafter Brundtland
Report], available at http://www.un-documents.net/wced-ocf.htm (defining
“sustainable development” as “development that meets the needs of the present
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”).
The term embodies “two key concepts: the concept of needs, in particular the
essential needs of the world’s poor, to which overriding priority should be given;
and the idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and social
organization on the environment’s ability to meet present and future needs.” Id.
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II. EXPANSION OF THE WTO MANDATE
From 1947 to 1995, the GATT’s mandate was limited to two
goals: market access and non-discrimination.7 At first, this was a
relatively simple task because the GATT was concerned primarily
with the reduction of tariffs. Over time, the rise of the regulatory
state resulted in the proliferation of non-tariff barriers (“NTBs”),
such as health and safety requirements and environmental
regulations. Thus, despite significant reduction, tariffs were
eventually replaced by NTBs, creating new challenges for the global
trading system.
GATT Contracting Parties recognized the limits of free trade, and
this recognition is most visible in Article XX, the general exceptions
to the GATT. Article XX acknowledged that, in some exceptional
cases, other important policy objectives, such as human health, could
(and should) trump the goal of free trade through liberalization of
markets and application of non-discrimination principles.8 GATT
panels, however, did not engage in the process of weighing and
balancing non-trade interests with trade interests. As a result, no
Contracting Party invoked Article XX in successful defense of a
trade barrier.9
GATT panels and Contracting Parties also marginalized Article X
(“Publication and Administration of Trade Regulations”). 10 The
7. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade pmbl., Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT] (encouraging member states to “enter[]
into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements” that “substantial[ly]
reduc[e] tariffs and other barriers to trade and . . . eliminat[e] . . . discriminatory
treatment in international commerce”). Achievement of these goals would meet the
ultimate objectives of “raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a
large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand,
developing the full use of the resources of the world[,] and expanding the
production and exchange of goods . . . .” Id.
8. See id. art. XX (“[N]othing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent
the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures . . . necessary to
protect human, animal, or plant life or health . . . .”).
9. Cf. Padideh Ala’i, Free Trade or Sustainable Development? An Analysis of
the WTO Appellate Body’s Shift to a More Balanced Approach to Trade
Liberalization, 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1129, 1130-71 (1999) (analyzing the
recent Article XX jurisprudence in which the Appellate Body has not
automatically upheld the free trade goals of GATT over any other objective,
including public health, sustainable development, or the environment).
10. See generally Padideh Ala’i, From the Periphery to the Center? The
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rationale behind this marginalization was the relatively narrow
mandate of the GATT 1947—that is, all barriers to trade in goods
must be removed or applied in a non-discriminatory manner. GATT
panels, in adherence to a substance-procedure distinction, deemed
Article X (a procedural provision) to be far less important than the
other, substantive provisions of the GATT. Their reasoning generally
was as follows: A challenged measure is first assessed for its
consistency with one or more of the “substantive” provisions of the
GATT—for example, the MFN obligation under Article I, the
“national treatment” requirement under Article III, or the prohibition
of quantitative restrictions under Article XI. If the measure is found
to be inconsistent with any of those “substantive” provisions, as
many invariably were, the process, procedures, or regulations by
which that measure is administered becomes a subsidiary issue. In
other words, if a measure is “substantively” inconsistent with the
obligations of the Contracting Parties, the publication of the measure
or whether it is applied in an “impartial, uniform and reasonable
manner” is irrelevant.11
Evolving WTO Jurisprudence on Transparency and Good Governance, 11 J. INT’L
ECON. L. 779 (2008), reprinted in REDESIGNING THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 165 (Debra P. Steger ed., 2009),
available at http://idl-bnc.idrc.ca/dspace/bitstream/10625/40859/1/128972.pdf
(contrasting GATT panels’ recognition of Article X as “‘subsidiary’ to other,
‘substantive’ provisions of the GATT and the WTO view of Article X to include
fundamentally important obligations, such as transparency and due process).
Article X was mentioned in only nine adopted GATT 1947 panel decisions. Id. at
783. Among these decisions, only two—Canada—Provincial Liquor Boards (U.S.)
and European Economic Community—Restrictions on Imports of Dessert Apples—
discuss Article X in detail. See id. at 786; see also Report of the Panel, Canada—
Import, Distribution and Sale of Certain Alcoholic Drinks by Provincial Marketing
Agencies, DS17/R (Oct. 16, 1991), GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 27 (1992);
Report of the Panel, European Economic Community—Restrictions on Imports of
Dessert Apples—Complaint by Chile, L/6491 (Apr. 18, 1989), GATT B.I.S.D.
(36th Supp.) at 93 (1990). In the remaining cases, the panels dismissed the Article
X claims as subsidiary issues that did not need to be addressed. See Ala’i, supra, at
786.
11. GATT art. X:3. For instance, in Japan—Leather II (U.S.), the panel did not
examine the Article X claim because the measure had already been found to
violate Article XI. See Report of the Panel, Panel on Japanese Measures on
Imports of Leather, ¶¶ 56-57, L/5623 (Mar. 2, 1984), GATT B.I.S.D. (31st Supp.)
at 94 (1985) [hereinafter Japan—Leather II] (finding Japanese arguments
insufficient to “rebut the presumption that the quantitative restrictions on imports
of leather had nullified or impaired benefits accruing to the United States under
Article XI [as well as under Articles II and XIII:3] of the General Agreement”).
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The creation of the WTO in 1995 brought GATT Article X (and
other procedural provisions) as well as GATT Article XX to the
forefront of WTO jurisprudence. The provisions of the WTO
Agreements reflect the reality of the regulatory state and, with it, a
recognition that certain categories of regulation, such as sanitary and
phytosanitary regulations or technical regulations or standards, are
legitimate despite their impact on trade. Therefore, in the past two
decades, the focus of WTO panels and the Appellate Body has
shifted from harmonization and mutual recognition to transparent
application and administration.
In 1994, the preamble of the GATT was amended to reflect current
environmental concerns and post–World War II changes in the trade
landscape. As a result, today the preamble of the WTO Agreement
also includes the following italicized language:
Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic
endeavour should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living,
ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real
income and effective demand, and expanding the production of and trade
in goods and services, while allowing for the optimal use of the world’s
resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development,
seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the
means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs and
concerns at different levels of economic development.12

The Appellate Body’s interpretation of GATT Article XX reflects
Similarly, in Japan—Agricultural Products I, the panel found the Japanese
measure to be in violation of Article XI:1 and thus did not rule on the Article X
claim. See Report of the Panel, Japan—Restrictions on Imports of Certain
Agricultural Products, ¶ 5.4.2, L/6523 (Nov. 18, 1987), GATT B.I.S.D. (35th
Supp.) at 163 (1988) [hereinafter Japan—Agricultural Products] (foregoing a
finding on the quantitative restrictions because “the United States had, as a
subsidiary matter, argued that Japan had also nullified or impaired benefits under
Articles X:1, X:3 and XIII:3”). Once more, the panel in Japan—Semi-Conductors
declined to rule on the Article X claim but impliedly acknowledged the
transparency issue that existed with the Japanese system of “administrative
guidance,” stating that the system “was a traditional tool of Japanese government
policy based on consensus and peer pressure.” See Report of the Panel, Japan—
Trade in Semi-Conductors, ¶ 107, L/6309 (Mar. 24, 1988), GATT B.I.S.D. (35th
Supp.) at 116 (1989) [hereinafter Japan—Semi-Conductors].
12. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
pmbl., Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter WTO Agreement] (emphasis
added).
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this amendment and is thus consistent with the requirements of
Article 3.2 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding and Articles 31
and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 13 In U.S.—
Shrimp, the Appellate Body held that the scope of Article XX has
changed given the new preambular language referencing the
“objective of sustainable development.”14 Specifically, it noted that
the change to the GATT 1947 preamble, which originally had been
used as a “template for the preamble of the new WTO Agreement,”
clearly qualified the original objectives of the GATT 1947. 15 The
Appellate Body continued:
We note once more that this language demonstrates recognition by WTO
negotiators that optimal use of the world’s resources should be made in
accordance with the objective of sustainable development. As this
preambular language reflects the intentions of the negotiators of the WTO
Agreement, we believe it must add color, texture and shading to our
interpretation of the agreements annexed to the WTO Agreement, in this
case, the GATT 1994.16

In other words, the goal of the multilateral trading system can no
longer be seen simply as market liberalization and nondiscrimination.17 The preamble indicates that there is also a
“development” goal. However, whether the goal of “sustainable
development” supersedes the other, traditional goals of the trading
system is unclear.18 The impact of the preambular language, if any,
13. Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, ¶ 114, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter
U.S.—Shrimp] (“The Panel did not follow all of the steps [required by Article 3.2
of the DSU when] . . . applying the ‘customary rules of interpretation of public
international law.’”).
14. See id. ¶ 129 (noting that the “preamble of the WTO Agreement—which
informs not only the GATT 1994, but also the other covered agreements—
explicitly acknowledges ‘the objective of sustainable development’”).
15. See id. ¶ 152 (recognizing that the “full use of the resources of the world,”
an objective included in the preamble of GATT 1947, was not suitable for the
multilateral trading system of the 1990s).
16. Id. ¶ 153.
17. See id. ¶ 152 (implying that because the amended language references
“different levels of economic development,” the preamble, as amended, also takes
into account in interpreting the obligations contained therein the principle of
special and differential treatment for less developed countries).
18. The Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development states that the
pillars of sustainable development are “economic development, social
development and environmental protection at the local, national, regional and
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on the “substantive” provisions of the WTO such as Article I (MFN),
Article III (national treatment), Article XI (elimination of quotas and
other non-tariff barriers), as well as the provisions of the other Annex
1A Agreements or other obligations (such as those contained in
protocols of accession or working party reports) is also unclear and
beyond the scope of this paper. However, the increasing emphasis on
the principles of transparency and procedural due process is closely
linked to the expansion of the WTO mandate and the promotion of
the “objective of sustainable development.”

III.EXPANSION OF THE TRANSPARENCY GOAL
OF THE WTO AND THE HISTORY AND
EVOLUTION OF ARTICLE X
The oldest transparency provision of the WTO is contained in
Article X of the GATT. Since the creation of the WTO, the scope
and influence of Article X has increased dramatically. Moreover, the
scope and influence of transparency as a goal of the multilateral
trading system itself has expanded, through the proliferation of the
values expressed in Article X and elsewhere in the WTO
Agreements.
The text of Article X is identical to the language originally
proposed by the U.S. State Department in 1946 as Article 15 of the
International Trade Organization (“ITO”) Charter and, upon failure
of the ITO, inserted into the GATT as Article X. The wording of
Article X is clearly derived from the U.S. Administrative Procedure
global levels.” World Summit on Sustainable Development, Aug. 26-Sept. 4, 2002,
Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development, at 1, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.199/L.6/Rev.2 (Sept. 4, 2002) (Report/CONF.199/20). “The main link
between trade and sustainable development,” according to the Brundtland
Commission:
is the use of non-renewable raw materials to earn foreign exchange. Developing
countries face the dilemma of having to use commodities as exports, in order to break
foreign exchange constraints on growth, while also having to minimize damage to the
environmental resource base supporting this growth. There are other links between
trade and sustainable development; if protectionism raises barriers against
manufactured exports, for example, developing nations have less scope for
diversifying away from traditional commodities. And unsustainable development may
arise not only from overuse of certain commodities but from manufactured goods that
are potentially polluting.

Brundtland Report, supra note 6, ch. 3, ¶ 41.
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Act (APA), passed in 1946.19 Article X:1 requires “all laws,
regulations, judicial rulings, and administrative rulings of general
application [(collectively ‘measures’) to be] published promptly in
such manner as to enable governments and traders to become
acquainted with them.”20 Article X:2 prohibits enforcement of such
measures before publication.21 Article X:3 requires all measures to be
administered in a “uniform, impartial and reasonable manner” and
compels Members to establish tribunals or procedures for review of
the administrative actions relating to customs matters.22
The creation of the WTO resulted in the proliferation of Article
X–type provisions concentrating on transparency and procedural due
process. Some of the other Annex 1A Agreements refer to Article X
specifically.23 Many of them, such as the Anti-Dumping (AD) Code
and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, have
their own (additional) transparency and due process requirements,
however.24 In such cases, the relationship of Article X with the
19. See generally Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2006)
(directing U.S. federal agencies to make certain government-held information
publicly available through publication in the Federal Register).
20. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 art. X:1, Apr. 15, 1994,
WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT 1994].
21. It provides:
No measure of general application taken by any contracting party effecting an advance
in a rate of duty or other charge on imports under an established and uniform practice,
or imposing a new or more burdensome requirement, restriction or prohibition on
imports, or on the transfer of payments therefor, shall be enforced before such measure
has been officially published.

See id. art. X:2
22. See id. art. X:3.
23. See Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, 1868
U.N.T.S. 279 (“Laws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative rulings of
general application giving effect to this Agreement shall be published in
conformity with Article X of GATT 1994 by the country of importation
concerned.”); Agreement on Rules of Origin, Apr. 15, 1994, 1868 U.N.T.S. 397
(“[L]aws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative rulings of general
application relating to rules of origin are published as if they were subject to and in
accordance with, the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article X of GATT 1994.”);
Agreement on Safeguards, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 154 (“A Member may
apply a safeguard measure only following an investigation by the competent
authorities of that Member pursuant to procedures previously established and made
public in consonance with Article X of GATT 1994.”).
24. See, e.g., Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15,
1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 14 [hereinafter SCM
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specific due process and transparency provisions of the other Annex
1A Agreements remains unclear.25 The requirements of Article X
were made applicable to trade in services and to intellectual property
rights. Articles III (“Transparency”) and VI (“Domestic Regulation”)
of the General Agreement on Trade in Services replicate the
language of Article X of the GATT.26 Similarly, Article 63 of the
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement
establishes publication, notification, and independent judicial review
requirements similar to those of Article X.27 The Trade Policy
Review Mechanism (“TPRM”) of the WTO is also primarily a
transparency-related mechanism. TPRM’s explicit objective is to
increase adherence by WTO members to the rules and disciplines,
and their commitments, “by [the] achiev[ement of] greater
transparency in, and understanding of, the trade policies and
practices of Members.”28 WTO transparency obligations may extend
beyond the text of negotiations from the Uruguay Round as
Agreement] (requiring written application and sufficient evidence of a subsidy to
penalize Members for violations).
25. E.g., Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493;
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120;
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, 1868 U.N.T.S. 201; Agreement on Import
Licensing Procedures, Apr. 15, 1994, 1868 U.N.T.S. 436; SCM Agreement, supra
note 24.
26. Compare General Agreement on Trade in Services art. III, Apr. 15, 1994,
WTO Agreement, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183 (requiring WTO Members to
publish all relevant measures including international agreements affecting trade in
services, annually inform the WTO Council on Trade in Services about any
changes made to the laws that affect trade in services and the commitments that
each member has made under that agreement, and establish inquiry points to
provide information to other WTO members), and id. art. VI (requiring members
to maintain “judicial, arbitral or administrative tribunals . . . [to review]
administrative decisions affecting trade in services”), with GATT 1994 art. X:3
(mandating publication of trade regulations and directing contracting parties to
“maintain, or institute as soon as practicable, judicial, arbitral or administrative
tribunals . . .”).
27. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
art. 63, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299
(mandating publication of all intellectual property measures and notification of the
WTO Council for TRIPS as well as allowing member objection to judicial and
administrative rulings).
28. Trade Policy Review Mechanism, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex
3, 1869 U.N.T.S. 480.
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additional transparency and good governance provisions are found in
WTO accession protocols. The most noteworthy example is the
Protocol of Accession of the People’s Republic of China, which
requires publication and ready availability for enforcement.29
The evolution of Article X from a peripheral and subsidiary
obligation to a provision of fundamental importance to the
multilateral trading system clearly supports the expansion of the
transparency mandate of the WTO, from that of the GATT. This
evolution is also important because it demonstrates the role of the
Dispute Settlement Mechanism in fashioning how procedural
fairness criteria are becoming central to the WTO system,
particularly as it ventures into “non-economic” areas, such as public
health, human rights, and the environment.
From 1947 to 1994, only nine panel decisions involving Article X
of the GATT were adopted.30 Article X was first mentioned in 1984
in a claim filed by the United States against Japan for the use of
29. See Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, art.
2(C)(1), WT/L/432 (Nov. 23, 2001) (directing China to enforce only those traderelated laws or regulations that have been published and are readily available to
other WTO Members). Article 2(C) of the Protocol also requires China to establish
enquiry points through which WTO Members can request information on the
measures. See id. art 2(C)(3) (“China shall make available to WTO Members, upon
request, all laws, regulations and other measures pertaining to or affecting trade in
goods, services, TRIPS or the control of foreign exchange before such measures
are implemented or enforced.”).
30. Report of the Panel, Canada—Import, Distribution and Sale of Certain
Alcoholic Drinks by Provincial Marketing Agencies, DS17/R (Oct. 16, 1991),
GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 27 (1992); Report of the Panel, European
Economic Community—Regulation on Imports of Parts and Components, L/6657
(Mar. 22, 1990), GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 132 (1991); Report of the Panel,
Canada—Import Restrictions on Ice Cream and Yoghurt, L/6568 (Sept. 27, 1989),
GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 68 (1990); Report of the Panel, European
Economic Community—Restrictions on Imports of Apples—Complaint by the
United States, L/6513 (June 9, 1989), GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 135 (1990);
Report of the Panel, Republic of Korea—Restrictions on Imports of Beef—
Complaint by the United States, L/6503 (May 24, 1989), GATT B.I.S.D. (36th
Supp.) at 268; Report of the Panel, European Economic Community—Restrictions
on Imports of Dessert Apples—Complaint by Chile, L/6491 (Apr. 18, 1989),
GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 93; Japan—Semi-Conductors, supra note 11, at
116; Japan—Agricultural Products, supra note 11, at 163; Japan—Leather II,
supra note 11, at 94; see also Report of the Panel, United States—Countervailing
Duties on Non-Rubber Footwear from Brazil, SCM/94 (Oct. 4, 1989) GATT
B.I.S.D. (42d Supp.) at 208 (1995).
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“administrative guidance.”31 In fact, the first three Article X cases
focused on Japan’s practice of administrative guidance. In all of
these initial cases, the issue of transparency—specifically,
publication—was viewed as a subsidiary obligation to the more
substantive provisions of the GATT found in Articles III and XI:1.
Under the WTO Agreements, over twenty cases have alleged
violations of Article X specifically and many other disputes have
focused on transparency-related obligations set forth in other
provisions, such as the Anti-Dumping Code. Article X has been
invoked by Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador,
Guatemala, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, Thailand,
Turkey, and the United States. This diversity demonstrates the
growing consensus among Members that the expectations for market
access and the non-discrimination goals of the trading system cannot
be met without transparency in administration of measures.
As early as 1997, the Appellate Body stated that Article X “may
be seen to embody a principle of fundamental importance . . . known
as the principle of transparency that has obvious[] due process
dimensions.”32 The Appellate Body also has expanded the scope of
Article X through interpretations of its provisions. It held that
“measures of general application” covered under Article X:1 include
even a single administrative ruling applicable to one company or
shipment if the application establishes a principle which will be
applicable in future cases. The Appellate Body interpreted the Article
X:3 requirement of “uniform” application to entail equal treatment of
importers and exporters under customs procedures, in keeping with
their expectations, but also in “access to information” and “flow of
information.” For example, in Dominican Republic—Import and Sale
of Cigarettes, the WTO panel and the Appellate Body found
violations of Article X when a survey used as the basis of a tax was
not published.33 In addition, the Appellate Body made Article X
31. Cf. Japan—Leather II, supra note 11, ¶ 16 (considering the claim by the
United States that Japan violated the reasonableness requirements of Article X:3 in
its administration of leather import quotas as well as in its refusal to publish global
quotas and lists of license holders).
32. Appellate Body Report, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Cotton
and Man-Made Fibre Underwear, at 19, WT/DS24/AB/R (Feb. 10, 1997).
33. See Panel Report, Dominican Republic—Measures Affecting the
Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes, ¶¶ 7.405-06, WT/DS302/R (Nov. 26,
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applicable to the Agreement on Import Licensing despite the
Agreement’s silence on Article X and its provision of a separate
procedure. Finally, in EC—Selected Customs Matters, for the first
time a dispute centered solely on the provisions of Article X:3(a) and
no other “substantive” provisions. In the dispute, the United States
claimed that the European Community’s system of customs
administration was inconsistent with the Article X:3(a) requirement
that measures be administered in a “uniform” manner. The Appellate
Body held that although it was appropriate to challenge a measure
“as a whole or overall” under Article X, and that the United States
had appropriately raised that claim on appeal, there was not enough
facts for the Appellate Body to rule on the claim “as a whole.”34
Importantly,
the
Appellate
Body
undermined
the
substance/procedure distinction, stating that the substance of a
measure can be challenged under Article X if such substance
“necessarily leads to” lack of uniform application.35
In sum, during the past fifteen years, WTO members and the
Appellate Body have expanded the scope and reach of Article X
incrementally. Such expansive interpretations have not yet resulted
in many actual findings of inconsistency with Article X. However,
there have been some. The scope of Article X is also important as it
has been invoked by the Appellate Body as being applicable to the
preamble or chapeau of Article XX. To elaborate on this point, the
discussion turns to Article XX and, ultimately, the relationship
between Articles X and XX.

2004) (concluding that the average-price surveys conducted for the determination
of the tax base for cigarettes were a crucial element of an administrative ruling for
the purpose of analyzing a violation of the publishing requirement of Article X).
34. See Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Selected Customs
Matters, ¶¶ 172-73, 201, WT/DS315/AB/R (Nov. 13, 2006) [hereinafter EC—
Customs] (finding that mere citation to the provisions of a challenged legal
instrument under Article X:3(a) is insufficient to prove unallowable administration
of such legal instrument).
35. See id. ¶ 201 (“The complainant must discharge the burden of
substantiating how and why those provisions necessarily lead to impermissible
administration of the legal instrument of the kind described in Article X:1.”
(emphasis added)).
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IV.HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF ARTICLE XX
The general exceptions listed in Article XX of the GATT can be
traced to the 1927 International Agreement for the Suppression of
Import and Export Prohibitions and Restrictions.36 The same general
exceptions were subsequently incorporated during negotiations for
the creation of the ITO.37 As the drafting history of the ITO Charter
indicates, the drafting of the General Exceptions provision—
ultimately GATT Article XX —was controversial due to the
proposed scope of the exceptions provided and the “divergence of
national practices” on the issues addressed.38 From the very
beginning there was concern that the provision could be used to
disguise protectionism. That is why the Netherlands and the BelgoLuxembourg Economic Union proposed the addition of the italicized
language, below:
Subject to the requirement that such measures not be applied in a manner
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a
disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in Agreement shall be
construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party
of measures:
36. Compare GATT 1994 art. XX (excluding measures which are necessary for
the protection of public morals, human, animal, or plant life or health, or those
needed for the preservation of national treasures with artistic, historic, or
archaeological value), with Convention for the Abolition of Import and Export
Prohibitions and Restrictions, Nov. 8, 1927, 46 Stat. 2461, 97 L.N.T.S. 393,
reprinted in 25 AM. J. INT’L L. 121 (1931) (detailing that Members’ prohibitions
based on moral or humanitarian grounds and the protection of public health,
animal and plant life, and national treasures shall not be forbidden by the
Convention). Article IV provides an exception for, among other things, rules and
regulations that are “issued on grounds of public health” or “imposed for moral or
humanitarian reasons . . . .” GATT 1994 art. IV.
37. Appellate Body Report, Korea - Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh,
Chilled and Frozen Beef, ¶ 164, WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R (Dec. 11,
2000) “(We note that, in its analysis, the Panel also referred to the negotiating
history of the GATT 1947, and particularly to the rejection of a proposal presented
by India during the negotiations on the International Trade Organization (the
“ITO”) Charter according to which Members would be permitted to justify, on a
temporary basis, retaliatory measures under Article XX”).
38. See generally The GATT Years: from Havana to Marrakesh, WTO,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm (last visited Sept.
1, 2011) (portraying the ITO draft charter as “ambitious” because it addressed not
only trade but also rules on national issues such as employment, commodity
agreements, restrictive business practices, and services).
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(a) necessary to protect public morals;
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; [or]
...
(g) relating to the conservation of an exhaustible natural resources if such
measures are made in conjunction with restrictions on domestic
production or consumption. 39

This original amendment to the chapeau language (of what
eventually became Article XX) has never been changed or amended.
During the GATT years, the Article XX exceptions contained under
the subparagraph were construed so strictly that the application of the
preamble language on such measures was rarely discussed. GATT
panels did not address Article XX concerns unless a party invoked
the Article to defend a measure, and in all such cases, the invoking
party lost.40 At issue in the adopted decisions were subparagraphs (b)
and (g) of Article XX. As far as subparagraph (g) was concerned, the
words “relating to” and “in conjunction with” were interpreted to
39. GATT 1994 art. XX. “Indirect protectionism is an undesirable and
dangerous phenomenon. Many times stipulations to ‘protect animal or plant life or
health’ are misused for indirect protection. It is recommended to insert a clause
which prohibits expressly [the use of] such measures [to] constitute an indirect
protection . . . .” 1 WTO, WTO ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE TO WTO LAW AND
PRACTICE 344 n.655 (1st ed. 2003).
40. See, e.g., Report of the Panel, United States—Restrictions on Imports of
Tuna, ¶ 5.22, DS21/R (Sept. 3, 1991), GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 155
[hereinafter U.S.—Tuna I] (unadopted) (explaining that panels have traditionally
interpreted Article XX narrowly, mandated that the movant justify the Article’s
invocation, and not examined Article XX exceptions absent invocation). The
GATT panel held in U.S.—Tuna I that the Panel did not have an obligation to
examine Article XX exceptions unless raised by a party to the dispute. See id. Even
if a party raised an Article XX defense, the traditional analysis of the provisions of
Article XX by the GATT panels made it difficult, if not impossible, for the party to
meet its burden of proof. For instance, the panel in U.S.—Tuna I held that a party
can meet its burden of proof only when the party has: (1) adopted the least-GATTinconsistent measure; (2) proven that it exhausted all alternatives before its
adoption of the measure; and (3) applied the measure in the least-GATTinconsistent manner. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 4.4, 5.28. The largest hurdle was establishing
that the measure in question was the least GATT-inconsistent measure available, as
consideration was not granted to the whether a less GATT-inconsistent measure
would achieve the level of protection sought by the measure in place. See id. ¶¶
5.27-.29.
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mean “primarily aimed at.” The GATT panels held that even if a
measure was about an “exhaustible natural resource,” it was not
primarily aimed at preserving that resource, but rather primarily
aimed at changing another government’s conservation policies!
The word “necessary” in subparagraph (b) was interpreted as
when there “were no alternative measures consistent with the
[GATT] or less inconsistent with [the GATT].”41 In other words,
“only if” there was no other alternative would a trade barrier be
justified under subparagraph (b).42 Because the defending party had
the burden to show that there was no other alternative, the
requirement proved to be insurmountable. Other issues continued to
limit the scope of Article XX, including panel statements seeming to
question whether measures that extra-territorial application could
ever be justified under these exceptions.43 As far as the chapeau of
Article XX language was concerned, during the GATT 1947 years, it
was referenced as evidence of the fear of the drafters that Article XX
would be used for protectionist means, and therefore, mandating very
strict interpretations of what would be a valid measure under Article
XX. But because the measures invariably failed under the
requirements of the subparagraph, the requirements of the chapeau
were not discussed in any great depth.
The WTO Agreement, as applied by the Appellate Body, changed
all this, resuscitating Article XX from its previously vegetative state.
41. Report of the Panel, Thailand—Restrictions on Importation of and Internal
Taxes on Cigarettes, ¶ 75, DS10/R (Oct. 5, 1990), GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at
200.
42. See id. (recognizing the argument by the United States that the
inconsistency of Thailand’s acts with Article XI:1 should not be considered
“necessary” because Thailand could attain its public health objectives through
domestic measures permissible under Article III:4).
43. See, e.g., U.S.—Tuna I, supra note 40, ¶ 5.28 (holding that although Article
XX does not apply to extra-jurisdictional measures, this limitation is overcome by
the occasional presence of dolphins in U.S. territorial waters). In U.S.—Tuna II, the
Panel reversed the earlier analysis stating that there is no extra-jurisdictional
limitation on Article XX-type measures. See Report of the Panel, United States—
Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, ¶ 5.11, DS29/R (June 16, 1994) (unadopted)
(accepting the argument by the United States that Article XX(g) does not mandate
the presence of an “exhaustible natural resource” within the territorial jurisdiction
of the country taking the measure). The Appellate Body had yet to rule on the
extra-jurisdictional issue previously. See U.S.—Shrimp, supra note 13, ¶ 133 (“We
do not pass upon the question of whether there is an implied jurisdictional
limitation in Article XX(g), and if so, the nature or extent of that limitation.”).
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First, in U.S.—Gasoline, the Appellate Body overturned the Panel,
stating that the Gasoline Rule at issue was indeed consistent with
requirements of subparagraph (g) because of its primary aim of
conservation of natural resources and even-handed treatment vis-àvis the domestic industry. It held, therefore, that the measure
satisfied the requirements of the words “in conjunction with” as well
as “relating to.” Instead, the Appellate Body moved the analysis
away from the substance of the measure, and whether the measure on
its face was consistent with the subparagraph (g) and focused instead
on the application of the measure and the requirements of the Article
XX chapeau. In other words, there is no question according to the
Appellate Body that unilateral measures of this type are within the
scope of Article XX and that the chapeau of Article XX should not
be interpreted (as under the GATT 1947) to express merely the fear
of disguised protectionism through conservation measures, but also
to impose an additional procedural requirement that limits the trade
distortive effects of the measure (to the extent possible) given that
the measure had already been determined to be a legitimate measure
fitting under one of the subparagraphs of Article XX. Also in 1996,
in U.S.—Gasoline, the Appellate Body made clear that the meaning
of Article XX is not what it used to be under the GATT 1947 given
the preamble of the WTO Agreement and the Decision on Trade and
Environment.44 The Appellate Body, through its interpretation of the
WTO preamble and other decisions, changed the status of Article
XX from an exception narrowly interpreted for fear that it would
undermine the multilateral trading system to a provision that is
consistent with, and relevant to, the Appellate Body’s case-by-case
balancing approach. This approach stems directly from the Body’s
view of the WTO preamble and the expansion of the WTO mandate
44. See Appellate Body Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated
and Conventional Gasoline, at 29-30, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996).
Nevertheless, “[t]he ability of any WTO Member to take measures to control air
pollution, or more generally, to protect the environment is [not] at issue.” Id.
Putting that ability at issue, according to the Appellate Body, would:
ignore the fact that Article XX of the General Agreement [GATT 1994] contains
provisions designed to permit important state interests—including the protection of
human health, as well as the conservation of exhaustible natural resources to find
expression . . . . Indeed, in the preamble to the WTO Agreement and in the Decision on
Trade and Environment, there is specific acknowledgement to be found about the
importance of coordinating policies on trade and the environment.

Id.
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to include the “objective of sustainable development.” The change in
attitude towards Article XX from the GATT to the WTO has also
meant increased emphasis on procedure and a two-step approach to
application of Article XX. First, a measure is analyzed under an
Article XX subparagraph for its substantive adequacy and, second,
after finding that a measure meets the requirements of a
subparagraph, the measure’s application is weighed, under the
chapeau of Article XX, to ensure that the measure is not applied in
an arbitrary or unjustifiably discriminatory manner or as a disguised
restriction (although this latter category has yet to be subject to
clarification or scrutiny from the Appellate Body). This two-step
analysis originally set forth in U.S.—Gasoline was modified and
further expanded and clarified in U.S.—Shrimp.45
Other cases have clarified the scope of the subparagraphs of
Article XX and have upheld measures that meet the requirements of
a specific subparagraph. In EC—Asbestos, the Appellate Body found
a ban on the importation of asbestos and products containing
asbestos as permitted under Article XX(b) and the chapeau.46 The
Appellate Body could not find a reasonably available, less traderestrictive alternative that would allow the French government to
achieve its goal of zero health risk associated with asbestos. In other
words, the analysis of the word “necessary” in Article XX(b)
requires balancing the legitimate goals of the government with the
WTO-inconsistent trade restrictions. The more compelling the values
promoted by the government (for example, human health), the more
the measure can be trade-restrictive (for example, a blanket import
ban). This balancing act was explained further in U.S.—Gambling,47
Korea—Various Measures on Beef,48 Brazil—Retreaded Tyres,49 and
45. See generally Ala’i, supra note 9, at 1162-69 (providing a full discussion of
the United States’ import prohibition of certain shimp and shrimp products).
46. See Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting
Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, ¶¶ 75, 163, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar.
12, 2001) (concluding that the measure protected human life or health within the
meaning of Article XX(b)).
47. See Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting the CrossBorder Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, ¶ 307, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7,
2005) (“It is on the basis of this ‘weighing and balancing’ and comparison of
measures, taking into account the interests or values at stake, that a panel
determines whether a measure is ‘necessary’ . . . .”).
48. See Appellate Body Report, Korea—Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh,
Chilled and Frozen Beef, ¶ 164, WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R (Dec. 11,
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China—Publications and Audiovisual Products.50 In all of these
cases, the Appellate Body required a balancing act that also took into
account other reasonably available (less trade-restrictive)
alternatives.51
In the context of the chapeau of Article XX, the focus of the
balancing of interests is on transparency and due process rather than
the value of the objective pursued and the extent to which there may
be a less trade-restrictive measure that would achieve an equivalent
objective. The Appellate Body believes that the subparagraphs of
Article XX require a balancing of trade liberalization and other,
potentially overriding public policy considerations.52 In U.S.—
Shrimp, the Appellate Body moved the focus of such balancing from
the substance of the measure addressed in the subparagraph—that is,
2000) (“[D]etermination of whether a measure, which is not ‘indispensable,’ may
nevertheless be ‘necessary’ within the contemplation of Article XX(d) involves in
every case a process of weighing and balancing a series of factors . . . .”).
49. See Appellate Body Report, Brazil—Measures Affecting Imports of
Retreaded Tyres, ¶ 178, WT/DS332/AB/R (Dec. 3, 2007) [hereinafter Brazil—
Retreaded Tyres] (“[T]o determine whether a measure is ‘necessary’ within the
meaning of Article XX(b) of the GATT 1994, a panel must consider the relevant
factors, particularly the importance of interests or values at stake, the extent of the
contribution to the achievement of the measure’s objective, and its trade
restrictiveness.”).
50. See Appellate Body Report, China—Measures Affecting Trading Rights
and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment
Products, ¶ 251, WT/DS363/AB/R (Dec. 21, 2009) [hereinafter China—
Publications and Audiovisual Products] (recalling that “the term ‘necessary,’ in
the abstract, refers to a range of degrees of necessity . . . [which] involves a process
of weighing and balancing a series of factors that prominently include the
contribution made by the measure to secure compliance with the law or regulation,
and the accompanying impact of the law or regulation on imports or exports”).
51. E.g., Brazil—Retreaded Tyres, supra note 49, ¶ 178. In some of these
cases, of course, recourse was not made to the chapeau of Article XX because the
measure itself failed to meet the “substantive” requirements of the subparagraph.
52. See China—Publications and Audiovisual Products, supra note 50, ¶ 310
(stating that “if a Member chooses to adopt a very restrictive measure, it will have
to ensure that the measure is carefully designed so that the other elements to be
taken into account in weighing and balancing the factors relevant to an assessment
of the ‘necessity’ of the measure will ‘outweigh’ such restrictive effect”); see also
U.S.—Shrimp, supra note 13, ¶ 159 (noting that the purpose of the chapeau of
Article XX is to ensure that a Member’s invocation of an Article XX exception
does not “cancel out the [rights of other Members under a substantive provision of
the GATT 1994] and thereby distort and nullify or impair the balance of rights and
obligations constructed by the Members themselves in that Agreement”).
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whether the measure relates to “preservation of an exhaustible
natural resource” and is primarily aimed at rendering effective
“restrictions on domestic production or consumption”—to the
application of the measure, including the procedural aspects of a
measure (such as transparency-related criteria), addressed in the
chapeau of Article XX. Significantly, the Appellate Body in U.S.—
Shrimp acknowledged the importance of due process by making
reference to Article X as follows:
It is also clear to us that Article X:3 of the GATT 1994 establishes certain
minimum standards for transparency and procedural fairness in the
administration of trade regulations which, in our view, are not met here.
The non-transparent and ex–parte nature of the internal governmental
procedures applied by the competent officials . . . throughout the
certification processes . . . are all contrary to the spirit, if not the letter, of
Article X:3 of GATT 1994.53

V. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS: WHERE DO
WE GO FROM HERE?
The creation of the WTO has brought Articles X and XX from the
periphery of GATT jurisprudence to the center of WTO
jurisprudence. The evolution of the relationship between these two
provisions must be understood within the context of the preamble to
the WTO Agreement and the expansion of the trade mandate, which
has resulted in the erosion of the economic/non-economic distinction
that had dominated the post-World War II economic order. The
WTO preamble, as interpreted by the Appellate Body, requires
weighing and balancing trade-liberalization interests against the
equally important objective of sustainable development. The result of
such balancing, as may be expected, is an emphasis on procedural
transparency and the fairness of the mechanisms in place, rather than
a weighing of the substantive values at issue—for example,
conservation of an endangered species versus the “costs” associated
with restricting trade in violation of the WTO rules.
WTO panels and the Appellate Body cannot return to the simpler
days of the GATT 1947 when they could rely on an ideological bias
for the free market. That time is over. To retain its relevance and
legitimacy, the WTO must promote free trade without undermining
53. U.S.—Shrimp, supra note 13, ¶ 183.

2011]

TRANSPARENCY AND THE WTO MANDATE

1029

other important and increasingly universal values, such as protection
and preservation of the environment, worker and human rights, and
protection of public health and this will be done by turning towards
transparency and predictability of a legal regime.
In the coming decades, the WTO will continue to tackle cuttingedge issues, such as climate change, renewable energy, and access to
clean water or medicine, largely because there are no other global
forums where countries can address conflicts between national
regulatory schemes. Unfortunately, the multilateral trade negotiations
are at an impasse as reflected by the failure of the Doha round of
trade negotiations and the increasing number of new issues that are
not adequately by the Doha agenda.
At the same time, the global economic downturn particularly in
the United States and European Union, raise the possibility of
increased protectionism. No other global forum has been able to
unite humankind in addressing its common problems. It may well be
however that that Bretton Woods System is no longer functioning
appropriately to address global challenges. In the absence of other
global forum, it is inevitable that the WTO members will continue to
turn to the WTO Dispute Settlement System (the WTO panels and,
ultimately, the Appellate Body) to address contentious issues and
policies on a case by case basis. Will the Appellate Body be able to
address such issues without undermining itself? The answer to this
question is unclear. If the past is any indication, the future will see
an increasing emphasis on transparency and due process by the
Appellate Body and the WTO panels.
Case-specific balancing of interests will be a very difficult task
requiring the WTO to focus on the legitimacy of the process at both
the national and the WTO level. As such, the WTO increasingly will
focus on: (1) internal transparency of its own decision-making and
(2) domestic transparency and predictability in the application of
measures that are trade-restrictive or discriminatory, but that
nevertheless promote values important to sustainable development.
Article X and Article XX values are inextricably linked for the
foreseeable future. The evolution in interpretation and application of
these two provisions and the values they represent will be crucial to
the future of the WTO, its legitimacy, and its role in promoting
sustainable development.

